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Abstract: The behavior of outside portfolio managers of large money-center banks as 
analyzed to date is silent.  In a centralized loan portfolio construction with 
decentralized loan portfolio management, changes in the bank’s degree of capital 
market imperfection have direct effects on the bank’s interest margin through the 
centralized as well as the decentralized loan rate determinations.  We use a two-stage 
model of option-based analysis to study how information asymmetry and optimal 
bank loan rates relate to one another.  We find that the decentralized loan rate 
managed by the outside loan manager is positively related to the bank’s degree of 
capital market imperfection.  The centralized loan rate managed by the bank is 
positively related to its degree of capital market imperfection under strategic 
complements, but negatively under strategic substitutes.   
 
Key-words: Centralized vs. decentralized loan rate; Information asymmetry; 
Black-Scholes formula. 
 
1 Introduction 
    It is widely recognized that many 
financial institutions employ outside 
portfolio managers to manage part or all 
of their investable funds.  The most 
likely institutions include pension funds, 
private endowments, and private trusts.1  
Although the employment of an outside 
portfolio manager is less likely to be 
currently observed in banking firms than 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Elton and Gruber (2004). 
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that in the previous financial institutions, 
there may be instances when 
money-center banks have experienced 
diversified financial problems due to 
their information asymmetry or 
insufficiency of agricultural, real estate, 
and oil-related lending businesses.  We 
do an alternative examination and argue 
that concerns with bank diversified 
lending quality may prompt 
money-center banks to adopt the outside 
administrator’s portfolio management.  
The relevant problem of financial 
institutions delegating decision making 
has been recognized in the practitioners’ 
literature on loan portfolio management 
(see, for example, diBartolomero 
(1999)). 
    In their recent paper on “Optimum 
Centralized Portfolio Construction with 
Decentralized Portfolio Management,” 
Elton and Gruber (2004) argue that the 
centralized portfolio is unlikely to be 
optimum since the individually managed 
portfolios themselves are constructed 
without taking into account the 
portfolios of the other managers.  
Hence, information asymmetry takes 
place.  Elton and Gruber (2004) 
construct a portfolio using standard 
portfolio theory to show that a central 
decision maker can make optimal 
decisions without requiring 
decentralized decision makers to reveal 
estimates of investment returns.  Their 
model neatly presents how an 
implemental set of rules is derived to 
lead to optimal portfolios under 
centralized decision-making. 
    Their model explains why and how 
the centralized and decentralized 
decision makers make their own 
portfolio (risk) decisions, but not their 
own operation (rate and equity return) 
decisions, at least not major ones.  As 
an alternative, we develop a model of 
centralized portfolio construction with 
decentralized portfolio management that 
integrates the risk considerations of the 
portfolio-theoretic approach with market 
conditions and cost considerations of the 
firm-theoretic approach.  Banks are in 
the business of lending and borrowing 
money.  Hirtle and Stiroh (2007) 
demonstrate that U. S. banks, particular 
the largest, have dramatically expanded 
their retail banking operations over the 
last few years.  Earnings from the 
margin between interest rates on assets 
and interest rates on liabilities account 
for bank profits significantly.  The aim 
of this paper is to examine the 
inter-relatedness of centralized and 
decentralized loan rate-setting behavior 
(bank interest margin determination) and 
information asymmetry.   
    To do this, we use a two-stage 
model of option-based valuation to 
examine a bank’s choice of its 
centralized loan rate in the first stage, 
and the determination of the outside 
manager’s decentralized loan rate in the 
second stage.  In the decentralized 
loan-rate setting stage, we find that an 
increase in the degree of capital market 
imperfection increases the outside 
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manager’s optimal loan rate (and thus 
the bank’s margin).  In the centralized 
loan-rate setting stage, we show that an 
increase in the degree of capital market 
imperfection decreases (increases) the 
bank’s optimal loan rate under strategic 
substitutes (strategic complements).  
    One immediate application of this 
paper is to evaluate the outside manager 
employment of lending arrangement 
proposed as an alternative for future 
loans.  In particular, one frequent 
suggestion is for the bank to employ an 
outside manager when information in 
different markets is asymmetric.  This 
paper provides one explanation why this 
should be expected since the bank’s 
interest margin increases through its 
outsider manager’s loan rate-setting with 
an increase in the degree of capital 
market imperfection.  
    Two relevant distinctions have been 
employed in the literature to model the 
centralized decision maker delegating 
management responsibility.  First, a 
number of authors, for example, 
Marschak and Radner (1972), and 
Ohlson (1975, 1979) have adopted a 
crucial assumption, that the 
decentralized managers are willing to 
provide all information to a centralized 
manager, as their analytical apparatus.  
This assumption has been examined for 
the pension fund problem by Rosenberg 
(1977) and diBartolomeo (1999).  They 
argue that with full information, the 
decentralized portfolio managers will 
not make better decisions than the 
centralized decision maker.  Second, 
Elton and Gruber (2004) argue that the 
decentralized portfolio managers are 
unwilling to fully share information with 
the centralized decision maker, and 
demonstrate how the centralized 
decision maker tries to optimally 
manage a set of decentralized portfolio 
managers.   
    What makes the analysis in our 
paper special is the realistic assumption 
that a decentralized manager is not 
willing to share information with the 
centralized manager, perhaps because 
the decentralized manager believes that 
the centralized manager (the bank in our 
model) has concealed some information 
concerning the quality of its lending 
portfolio.  Thus, the bank’s behavioral 
determination with the choices of 
strategic assumptions is made bearing in 
mind its impact on its decentralized 
manager’s decision.  Our paper can be 
viewed as an expansion of previous 
literature on centralized vs. 
decentralized decision-making and 
offers a solution to a portfolio allocation 
problem. 
    This paper is organized as follows.  
Section 2 presents the basic structure of 
the model.  We then solve the 
decentralized problem of the bank’s 
portfolio management in Section 3.  
Section 4 derives the solution of the 
centralized management and the 
comparative static analysis.  Section 5 
provides a conclusion to the study. 
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2 The Model (the centralized decision maker) 
employs only one outside loan manager 
to manage part of its investable risky 
assets.  The bank may employ several 
outside portfolio managers to construct 
active portfolios.  Adding this 
complexity affects none of the 
qualitative results since we follow Elton 
and Gruber (2004) assumption, in which 
a decentralized manager is only willing 
to share partial information with the 
centralized decision maker and none 
with the other managers. 
    In order to get closed form, 
tractable solutions, a few simplifying 
assumptions are made.  We shall point 
out when these assumptions affect the 
qualitative results derived in this paper.  
    Our model is myopic in the sense 
that all financial decisions are made and 
values are determined within a 
one-period horizon, .  At 
, the bank accepts  dollars in 
deposits.  At , the bank provides 
depositors with a market rate of return 
equal to the risk-free rate, .  The 
bank is fully insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  
We assume zero premiums paid by the 
bank for deposit insurance.
10 ≤≤ t
D
DR
0=t
1=t
2  It should 
be apparent in what follows that this 
abstraction does not affect the basic 
conclusions of the paper. 
    Both the bank and its selected 
outside manager make term loans  
and , respectively, at , which 
mature and are paid off at .  Both 
the two loan markets faced by the bank 
and the outside manager are imperfectly 
competitive in the sense that they have 
some market power in lending activities 
(see Wong (1997)).   
L
EL 0=t
1=t
    Concerns about bank loan quality 
have promoted the regulatory authority 
to adopt a risk-based system of capital 
standards.  Capital regulation requires 
equity capital K  held by the bank tied 
to a fixed proportion  of the bank’s 
deposits, .  Following Zarruk 
and Madura (1992), the required ratio of 
capital-to-deposits  is an increasing 
function of the amount of the loans held 
by the bank at , 
q
/
qD
=t
K ≥
q
0 0>′=∂ qL∂q . 
    We start with a banking firm model 
of centralized portfolio construction 
with decentralized portfolio 
management.  We assume that the bank 
    The outside manager faces a loan 
demand function, which is a function of 
its loan interest rate, , and the 
interest rate on the bank’s loan interest 
rate, , .  The amount of 
loans decreases as the loan interest rate 
increases, 
ER
LR ),( ELE RRL
/ 0<∂∂ EE RL .  The demand 
for the outside manager’s lending is a 
positive function of the interest rate on 
the bank’s loans, 0>/ ∂∂ LR
EL
EL
L
.  This 
positive relation captures the 
reallocation effect of the bank’s 
earning-asset portfolio.  It is reasonable 
to believe that  and  is gross 
substitutes in the centralized portfolio 
construction with decentralized portfolio 
                                                 
2  Gianmarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993) 
showed how more sophisticated fee schemes can 
be used to reduce the moral hazard issue. 
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management.  We argue that the bank 
may not have incentives to employ the 
outside portfolio manager to manage 
part of its investable assets when  
and  are gross complements.  
There are two reasons for our argument.  
First, bank management is limited to its 
liquidity or balance-sheet constraint.  
Second, portfolio management is 
generally related to risk diversification 
rather than risk concentration. 
L
1
EL
    As mentioned previously, the 
outside portfolio manager is not willing 
to share all lending information with the 
bank, and this is expected to lead to 
sub-optimal portfolios due to 
information asymmetry.  Applying 
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002), we 
can model this adverse-selection 
problem explicitly.  For the sake of 
transparency, we adopt a very simple 
quadratic formulation where the outside 
manager’s lending repayments at =t  
is defined as 
.  Here  
measures the degree of capital market 
imperfection-- the larger it is, the more 
costly the outside manager’s lending 
relative to the frictionless case.  The 
premium  can be treated as the 
maximum amount the bank is willing to 
forego in order to avoid a random level 
of its profits due to information 
asymmetry. 
)2/)( 2EEEE cLLRV −=
2/2EcL
1( + c
    The bank has a loan demand 
function, which is a function of its loan 
interest rate, the interest rate on the 
outside manager decision, and the 
degree of capital market imperfection, 
.  Loan demand faced by 
the bank is a downward-sloping function 
of the loan rate, 
),,( cRRL EL
0/ <∂∂ LRL
/ ∂∂ RL
.  The 
demand for loans is a positive function 
of the interest rate on the outside 
manager’s lending rate, .  
The interpretation of this relation 
follows a similar argument as in the case 
of 
0>E
0>/ ∂∂ LE RL
0/
.  The demand for 
loans is a negative function of the bank’s 
degree of capital market imperfection, 
<∂∂ cL .  This assumption implies 
that the bank will decrease its lending 
with the presence of a higher degree of 
capital market imperfection. 
    When the capital requirement 
constraint is binding, the shadow price 
with the constraint is zero and the bank’s 
 is equal to the regulatory minimum 
capital-to-deposits ratio.
q
3   At the 
beginning of the period, the bank has the 
following liquidity or capital constraint: 
 
)11( +=+=++
q
KKDBLL E     (1) 
 
where B  is a composite variable that 
                                                 
3 If the capital constraint is not binding, the 
bank’s  is greater than the required minimum 
ratio.  The quantity of residual money market 
assets is exhausted and money market interest 
rates no longer are a useful measure of the 
marginal cost of lending.  From the viewpoint 
of efficiency, our model is limited to analyzing 
the binding case.  We note that the results 
derived from our model do not extend to the case 
where the bank’s capital constraint is not 
binding. 
q
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measures the difference between money 
market borrowing and lending. 4   To 
provide the liquidity on demand, the 
bank can lend and borrow in the money 
market at a given market rate, R .   
    At any time during the period 
horizon, the repayment of the risky loans 
under the bank’s determination is: 
 
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
<
=+=
lossesloanifV
loannoif
VLR
V
L
0
0)1(
losses   (2) 
 
Given the constraint in equation (1), 
the value of the bank’s earning-asset 
portfolio is: 
 
])11()[1( EE LL−
}/ q
q
KRVVA −++++=  
    (3) 
 
The value of the bank’s equity return 
at  is the residual value of the bank 
after meeting all of the obligations: 
1=t
 
S ,0max{= )1( KRA D+−   (4) 
 
The bank’s total obligations or total 
costs,  in our model, are 
only the deposit payment costs.  Both 
the resource costs of serving total loans, 
liquidity, and deposits, and the fixed cost 
are omitted for simplicity.   
qKRD /)1( +
    We follow a number of previous 
                                                 
 
                                                
authors, for example, Mullins and Pyle 
(1994), Lin, Lin, and Jou (2009), and 
Lin, Chang, and Lin (2009), and assume 
the objective of the bank to be the 
maximization of market value of equity 
return.  To do this, besides the first fold 
of the centralized decision maker’s task 
of deciding how much to invest in each 
portfolio, the second fold is to give the 
outside manager instructions that will 
result in its making an optimal loan rate 
( ) determination from the point of 
view of the overall plan.
ER
5  Overall, the 
bank’s objective is to instruct the outside 
manager to select R and then to set its 
loan rate LR  to ximize the market 
value of equity return.   
E  
ma
    Our model applies Merton’s 
method (1974) of the option-based 
valuation that the bank’s equity capital 
can be viewed as a call option in its 
risky assets.  The interpretation is that 
equity holders are residual claimants on 
the bank’s risky assets after all of the 
other obligations have been met.6  In 
 
5 Elton and Gruber (2004, p.483) demonstrate 
that there are in general four folds of the 
centralized decision maker’s task.  Besides the 
first and second folds mentioned above, the third 
fold is to design optimal incentives for 
decentralized decision makers (see, for example, 
Stoughton, 1993), and the fourth fold is to 
evaluate the decentralized performance (see, for 
example, Gervais, Lynch, and Musto, 2002).  
These two folds are not major issues in our 
paper.  
6 sometimes follows a geometric Brownian 
motion, 
V
VdWVdtdV σμ += , where μ  is an 
instantaneous drift, σ is an instantaneous 
volatility, and  is a standard Wiener process.  
Structural changes expressed by structural 
equation modeling (see Shih, Lin, Hsiao, Huang, 
Chiu, and Chen (2009)) are possible.  Such 
concerns are beyond the scope of this paper.  
W
4 Results derived from our model do not extend 
to the case where bond is not treasury bond 
(low-yield, risk-free) bond, but high-yield bond 
in money markets (Lee and Cheng (2008)).  
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our model, the strike price of the call 
option is the book value (or default-free 
value) of the bank’s liabilities net of the 
outside manager’s lending repayments, 
as well as the default-free money market 
funds.  We note that the value of the 
outside manager’s lending repayments is 
default-free because the cost of 
information asymmetry (through 
premium, ) has been explicitly 
introduced to the model.  Thus, when 
the value of the bank’s risky assets is 
less than the strike price, its value of 
equity capital is equal to zero. 
2/2EcL
 
where, 
]})11()[1( 
)
2
)(1{()1(
2
E
E
EE
D
LL
q
KR
cLLR
q
KRZ
−−+++
−+−
+
=
 
)
2
1(ln1 21 σμσ
++=
Z
Vd  
σ−= 12 dd  
11,
2
1
2
2 2 σσρσσσ VVV −+=  
DRRμ −=  
 
In equation (5), the bank’s equity 
market value consists of two terms.  
The first term associated with  
can be treated as the risk-adjusted 
present value of the bank’s interest 
earned from its risky loans.  The 
second term associated with  
can be recognized as the risk-adjusted 
present value of the bank’s net 
obligations to its initial depositors above 
and beyond its default-free value from 
the outside manager’s loan repayments.  
The cumulative standard normal 
distributions of  and  are 
the risk-adjusted factors of the first and 
second terms in equation (5) respectively.  
 is the variance with 
)( 1dN
)( 2dN
)2d)( 1dN (N
v
2σ σ  and 1σ  
being the instantaneous standard 
deviation of the rates of returns on the 
risky and default-free assets respectively.  
1,vρ  is the instantaneous correlation 
coefficient between the two earning 
assets of the bank’s portfolio.  μ  is the 
The objective function, as described 
by equation (4), has the feature of a 
contingent claim that the bank’s market 
value of equity capital can be an 
option-based value of call options 
effectively purchased by the equity 
holders of the bank.  To illustrate this 
feature, we express equation (4) as:7 
 
)()( 21 dNZedVNSMax
μ−−=     (5) 
                                                 
7 As pointed out by Black and Cox (1976), a 
possible weakness of this approach is that 
default only occurs at maturity of the risky loans.  
They propose to incorporate a barrier on the 
market value of firm asset for triggering default 
prior to the maturity.  Their approach is 
recognized as a down-and-call option pricing 
model.  Galluzio (1999) and Chou and Wang 
(2007) use the down-and-call option pricing 
approach for their discussions.  Gontis, 
Ruseckas, and Kononovičius (2010), and Power 
and Turvey (2010) present a nonlinear stochastic 
differential equation which mimics the 
probability density function of returns.  
Alternatively, we use the Black and Scholes’ 
(1973) formula, which is a nonlinear 
option-based function of the equity return.  
Results to be derived from our model do not 
extend to the down-and-call option pricing case. 
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net deposit spread rate, which is defined 
as the difference between R  and . DR
R
L
 
3 Decentralized Loan-Rate 
Setting Stage 
    The role of the bank is to use  
determined by the outside manager, and 
then to determine its optimal loan rate, 
, to maximize the market value of the 
centralized portfolio.  The two-stage 
setting unwinds in the two distinct 
stages of the determinations of  and 
.  In the first stage of centralized 
portfolio construction, the bank’s loan 
rate is determined and remains fixed for 
the remainder for the model.  In the 
second stage of decentralized portfolio 
management, the bank’s loan rate is 
revealed and the outside manager’s loan 
rate is set.  As we see below, the bank’s 
loan rate determination influences its 
outside manager’s loan rate decision.  
The outside manager’s loan rate decision 
is made taking into account the bank’s 
loan rate determination in the first stage.  
Conversely, in the first stage, the bank’s 
loan rate determination is made bearing 
in mind its impact on the equilibrium of 
the outside manager’s loan-rate setting 
stage.  Following Kreps and Wilson 
(1982), we recognize that the 
equilibrium for the bank’s loan rate 
choice and its outside manager’s loan 
rate determination is sequential.  We 
solve this two-stage model using 
backward induction.  Applying that 
method here, we analyze the 
decentralized loan-rate setting stage first, 
and then examine the centralized 
loan-rate setting stage in the next 
section. 
E
LR
ER
R
    Partially differentiating equation (5) 
with respect to , the first-order 
condition is given by: 
ER
 
0
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A problem in applying equation (5) 
is in calculating the cumulative normal 
distribution )(⋅N .  In equation (5), 
there is  
 
)(ln2
2
2
1
1
22
1
2
2
μ
σσ
+−=
−+=
Z
Vd
ddd
      (7) 
 
Following Hull (1993), we can use 
numerical procedures to evaluate 
.  One such approximation is 
expressed as  
)( 2dN
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)1 2d/(1k α+  =
33267.0=α , 436183.01 =a , 
, 9372980.03 =a1201676.02 −=a  
0
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2
2 22 >=
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In equation (6), we can rewrite the 
rm  as follows. te 22 /)( ddN ∂∂
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Further, 
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where 
012 ≠
∂
∂
=
∂ ER
∂
ER
dd  
 
Imposing condition (10) on the 
rst-order condition in equation (6), we 
have
fi
 the following simplied form: 
 
0)()( ∂−∂=∂ − dNeZdNVS μ 21 =∂∂ RRR EEE
(11) 
 
where a sufficient condition for an 
optimum is . 
In equilibrium condition (11), the 
k-adjusted lo  repayments 
of 
fro e degree of capital 
mark
0/ 22 <∂∂ ERS
first term on the right-hand side is the 
marginal ris an
E , describing how changes in the 
outside manager’s loan rate-setting 
affect the bank’s risk-adjusted loan 
repayments.  This term is positive in 
sign since L  and EL  is gross 
substitutes.  The second term is the 
marginal risk-adjusted net obligations of 
ER , which is positive ed on the 
equilibrium condition.  In the 
decentralized loan rate-setting stage, the 
ide manager maximizes the market 
value of the bank‘s equity return 
anticipating resolution in the optimal 
ER  determination. 
Consider next the impact on the 
outside manager’s optimal loan rate 
m a change in th
R
ts
 bas
ou
et imperfection due to information 
asymmetry.  Implicit differentiation of 
equation (11) with respect to c  yields: 
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The term, , can be 
interpreted as the dif erence between the 
information asymm ticity of loan 
paym , and that of 
net 
 
cd ∂∂ /1
f
etry elas
/)( cV ∂∂
)(/ ZZ ∂
s
perfection m
re ents, )/( Vc
increa
obligations, )/( cc ∂ .  The 
information asymmetry elasticity of loan 
repayments is unambiguously negative 
because an 
capital market im kes the 
bank’s risky loans more costly to grant. 
The information asymmetry elasticity of 
net obligations is indeterminate in sign.  
However, our model provides us with a 
hunch that this difference should be 
negative since information asymmetry is 
a loan-repayment issue rather than a 
net-obligation one in our setting of the 
paper.  Thus, we have 0/1
e in the degree of 
a
<∂∂ cd .  
In light of previous work, we establish 
the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 1: An increase in the degree 
of capital market imperfection increases 
the outside manager’s loan rate.  
nager, 
ho is not willing to fully share 
inform
Intuitively, there is the potential for 
adverse selection in the capital market, 
perhaps because the outside ma
w
ation with the bank (the 
centralized decision maker), has gained 
some information as to the quality of the 
bank’s earning-asset portfolio, and can 
use this information to exploit the 
centralized decision maker.  When the 
outside manager has a higher degree of 
information asymmetry in the capital 
market, the outside manager provides a 
return to a less lending base by 
increasing loan rate ER .  If loan 
demand )( EL  is relatively rate-elastic, 
a less of the outside manager’s lending 
repayment is possible at an increased 
loan rate ER .   
    Applying Kashyap, Rahan, and 
Stein’s argument (2002, p.42), we 
further argue that the higher the degree 
of information asymmetry, the more 
costly employing the outside manager is 
to the centralized decision maker.  An 
implication of the above argument is that 
the prudent man law spells out the costs 
of the centralized decision maker 
delegating management costs.  For 
example, the New York State Law on 
estate powers and trusts states that “The 
prudent investor standard authorizes a 
trustee to delegate investment and 
management functions if consistent with 
the duty to exercise skill, including 
special investment skills.”  In 
Proposition 1, the “special investment 
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skills” can be recognized as the outside 
manager’s loan determination, and the 
costs of “special investment skills” can 
be recognized as the centralized decision 
maker’s delegating costs due to 
information asymmetry. 
 
4 Centralized Loan-Rate Setting 
Stage 
    We realize that a decentralized loan 
rate )( ER  determinati
0
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e)(
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-
1
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1
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where 
on affects its 
entr loan rate decision .  
op ntralized loan rate,
 
c alized 
ce
tions
.  Partial 
ith respe
)( LR
 the 
l of 
rst-order
Thus, in our model, to choose the 
timal 
centralized decision maker must take the 
decentralized loan rate determination 
into account.  The selected centralized 
loan rate maximized the bank’s equity 
return along its outside manager’s 
loan-rate setting equilibrium condition 
in equation (11).  Under a unique 
market equilibrium assumption, 
)( LE RR  completely characterizes the 
outside manager’s loan-rate equilibrium 
as a function of the bank’s loan rate.  
We can substitute )  ( c,R,RS EL  to 
obtain ) )( ( c,RR,RS LEL .  Accordingly, 
 solves the following objective, 
) )( ( c,RR,RSMax LELRL
, where S  is 
defined in equation (5). the 
assump  are now ready 
to solve for the bank’s optimal choice of 
ting equation S  
condition is given by: 
 
the bank
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A sufficient condition for an 
um is .  The terms optim  022 <∂∂ LRS/
Lα  and Eα  
m
represent how changes in 
r
ount and outside 
ount, respectively  
cent
Bot
alized loan rate-setting affect the 
bank’s loan a
manager’s loan am . 
h sign f Ls o α  and Eα  depend on a 
strategic assumption of the bank’s 
centralized portfolio construction with 
decentralized portfolio management, 
LE R/R ∂∂ .  We apply Bulow, 
Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) and 
demonstrate that a crucial strategy in 
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determining the nature of the interactive 
 whether the bank regards 
both centralized and decentralized loans 
as strategic substitutes or strategic 
complements.  In other words, will a 
more aggressive strategy by the outside 
manager in the marginal lending and 
money market investment elicit an 
aggressive response from the centralized 
loan rate- setting, or will an aggressive 
strategy more likely be met with 
accommodation?  We discuss this in 
more detail below. 
    The term LE R/R ∂∂  is equal to 
)()( 222 ELE RS//RRS/ ∂∂∂∂∂− .  The 
numerator represen
strategy is
e changes in the ts th
r’s marg
en the bank adjusts its
 this
outside manage inal lending 
 loan 
erator is 
negative (and thus 0<∂∂ LE R/R ), the 
bank regards both centralized and 
decentralized loans as strategic 
substitutes, accordingly, 0<Lα  and 
0E >
wh
rate-setting.  If  num
α .  Based o eneral 
assumptions, it is reasonable to believe 
that the impact on the bank’s lending 
from a change in the centralized loan 
ing (the own-rate effect) is more 
significant than the impact on the 
outside manager’s lending from a 
change in the centralized loan 
rate-setting (the cross-rate effect), at 
least in the short run.  Thus, the sign of 
)( EL αα +  is negative.  But if the 
numerators LE RRS/ ∂∂∂
2  are positive 
(and thus 0>
n rath
rate-sett
er g
∂∂ LE R/R ), the bank 
regards both centralized and 
ed loans as strategic 
complement
decentraliz
s.  Lα  is 
fect (
still negative 
since the direct ef LRL/∂ ) is in 
general more significant than the 
indirect effect )))((( LEE R/RRL/ ∂∂
∂
∂∂ .  
Eα  follows a sim  argument as in the 
case of L
ilar
α .  According )EL α+  
is also negative. 
    In equation  
ciated with )( 1dN  represents how 
changes in the bank’s loan rate  
lending repayment with decentralized 
ly, (α
the 
 af
 
ent 
term
(13), term
fect its
va
i
 is
asso
firm
stra
portfolio management.  This 
risk-adjusted pres lue for marginal 
lending repayments can be recognized as 
the interest rate elasticity of the bank’s 
loan demand evaluated at the optimal 
LR .  This elasticity demonstrates that 
the bank operates on the elasticity 
portion of its loan demand curve 
) )( ( c,RR,RL LEL , just as a monopolistic 
 does.  The value of the bank’s loan 
repayments decrease when the bank 
increases its loan rate-setting under 
tutes.  The term 
associated with )( 2dN  represents how 
changes in the bank’s loan rate affect its 
net-obligation payment with 
decentralized portfolio management.  
The value of this  also negative in 
sign because of the existence of the 
first-order condition of equation (13).  
    Condition (13) implies that the 
bank sets its optimal loan rate at the 
point where the marginal loan 
repayment of loan rate equals th
tegic subst
e 
marginal net-obligation payment.  The 
result of the equilibrium condition 
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demonstrates the importance on strategic 
effect that the centralized portfolio 
construction has on decentralized 
portfolio management.  What is 
significant is that the optimal centralized 
portfolio depends not only on lending 
market power utilization but also on the 
strategic aspect of decentralized 
diversification management under 
information asymmetry.   
    We consider next the impact on the 
bank’s optimal loan rate from changes in 
information asymmetry.  Implicit 
differentiation of equation (13) with 
respect to c  yields: 
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/
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In the term , the 
difference between th nd the
second term can be i
ean profit effect, w ird term 
can b
When i
imal bank 
m
ank’s 
ptimal loan rate under strategic 
d 
me information, but is not willing to 
cRS L∂∂∂ /
2
e first term a
nterpreted as the 
hile the th
he variance 
 in 
 
m
e interpreted as t or risk 
effect.  The mean profit effect captures 
the difference changes in LRV ∂∂ /  and 
LRZ ∂∂ /  due to an increase in c .  The 
sign of this mean profit effect is 
indeterminate.  The variance effect 
demonstrates the changes )( 1d  
)2d  due to an increase in c .  
The sign of this variance effect is 
negative since the three terms in this 
effect are all negative in sign. 
    the mean profit effect s 
negative, the variance effect reinforces 
the mean profit effect.  The total effect 
of an increase in c  on the opt
N
and (N
interest rate is unambiguously negative.  
The negative total effect implies that the 
bank regards loan rate-setting and 
information asymmetry as strategic 
substitutes in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and 
Klemperer’s (1985) sense.s  But if the 
mean profit is positive, it is reasonable 
to believe that the negative variance is 
insufficient to offset the mean profit 
effect since c  is modeled in the mean 
profit effect directly, but indirectly in the 
variance effect.  Under the 
circumstances, the total effect of an 
increase in  on the optimal bank 
interest rate is positive.  This positive 
total effect implies the bank regards loan 
rate-setting and information asymmetry 
as strategic co plements.  
The result of equation (14) is stated 
in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition
c
 2: An increase in the 
degree of capital market imperfection 
decreases (increases) the b
o
substitutes (strategic complements). 
 
There is the potential for adverse 
selection in the capital market, perhaps 
because the outside manager has gaine
so
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share
ination 
based on an option-based firm-theoretic 
e centralized loan 
to 
es: 
Some Effects of Bond Indenture 
s,” Journal of Political 
37-659. 
 
 with the centralized decision 
maker.  Accordingly, the outside 
manager can use this information to 
exploit the centralized decision maker.  
When the bank has a higher degree of 
capital market imperfection, it provides 
a return to a larger lending base due to 
be exploited by its outsider manager.  
One way the bank may attempt to 
increase its total returns is by increasing 
total loan repayments at a reduced loan 
rate under strategic substitutes. 
 
5 Conclusions 
    This paper explores the optimal 
bank interest margin determ
model under th
portfolio construction with decentralized 
loan management.  The model 
demonstrates how capital market 
imperfection and risk conditions jointly 
determine the optimal bank interest 
margin decision.  We find that an 
increase in the bank’s (the centralized 
decision maker’s) degree of capital 
market imperfection increases the 
decentralized (the outsider manger’s) 
loan rate and thus the bank’s interest 
margin, increases its loan rate under 
strategic complements, and decreases its 
loan rate under strategic substitutes.  
One way the bank may attempt to 
augment its total equity returns is by 
employing a outside manage for 
diversified lending activities since there 
is information asymmetry in different 
loan markets.  Insofar as such changes 
in optimal loan rates in our two-stage 
framework affect the bank’s ability to 
sustain information asymmetry, these 
effects are relevant considerations in any 
centralized restructuring of the 
decentralized portfolio management. 
    One issue that has not been 
addressed in the optimal centralized loan 
portfolio construction when the 
decentralized managers are willing 
provide all information to the centralized 
manager.  Results to be derived from 
our model do not extend to the case 
when the assumption of perfect capital 
markets is made since a linear objective 
function would be appropriate (see 
Santomero (1984)).  Such concerns are 
beyond the scope of this paper, and so 
are not addressed here.  What this 
paper does demonstrate, however, is the 
important role played by centralized 
loan portfolio construction in affecting 
bank interest margin determination.  
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